THE NEW JERSEY EXPERIENCE:
ACCOMMODATING THE SEPARATION
BETWEEN THE LEGISLATURE
AND THE JUDICIARY
Honorable Marie L. Garibaldi*
Recently, I had the honor to deliver the 1992 Arthur T. Vanderbilt Lecture. Although I knew about Arthur T. Vanderbilt's
outstanding accomplishments as Dean of New York University
School of Law, as the architect of our current judiciary, and as
the Chief Justice of the New Jersey Supreme Court, it was not
until I began to work on this address that I realized what a truly
superb jurist he was. Like Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v.
Madison,' Vanderbilt had the foresight to establish the court's
right to define its powers early in the life of New Jersey's new
constitution. He did so in lucid and short opinions, written in
record-breaking time.

For example, Winbery v. Salisbury,2 his

landmark decision on the court's power, was argued on June 19,
1950, and his opinion was issued on June 27, eight days later.
The doctrine of separation of powers is a fundamental principle of American government. Our founding fathers were familiar with the writings of Locke, Montesquieu and Blackstone,
which suggested the theory of separation of powers among varied branches of government. The doctrine, however, did not
arise from, nor was it recognized as part of, English common
law.3
Instead, as Holdsworth in his History of English Law informs
us, the separation-of-powers doctrine arose from the long struggle of Englishmen against royal tyranny, which ultimately led to
* Associate Justice, New Jersey Supreme Court. B.A., Connecticut College,
1956; J.D., Columbia University School of Law, 1959; LL.M., New York University
School of Law, 1963.
This article is adapted from the Arthur T. Vanderbilt Lecture delivered before
the Harvard Law School Association of New Jersey on March 25, 1992. Because
this article began as a speech it is lightly footnoted.
I would like to acknowledge Patrick DeAlmeida, Esq., my law clerk during the
1991-1992 court term, for his assistance with this article.
1 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
2 5 N.J. 240, 74 A.2d 406, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 877 (1950).
3 Max Radin, The Doctrine of the Separationof Powers in Seventeenth Century Controversies, 86 U. PA. L. REV. 842, 843 (1938).
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the king's recognition of parliament's supremacy over matters of
legislation and taxation, and of the judiciary's independence
from both the king and parliament. 4 In this country, the rise of
the doctrine was fueled by conflicts between the early Americans,
the royal Governors and the English Board of Trade.5
When our federal Constitution was drafted, the doctrine as
applied in England was quite inflexible, with strict barriers between the monarchy and parliament. Perhaps because-we were a
new country, or perhaps as a reflection of colonial distaste for the
concentration of power at the expense of individual liberty and
security, the concept of rigid definitions of the branches' powers
was rejected by the framers of the American Constitution.
James Madison, the architect of our concept of separation of
powers, defined the doctrine's meaning for the founding fathers
in The Federalist Papers. From the beginning, Madison recognized that the separation-of-powers doctrine does not require an
absolute division of powers among the three branches of government. He maintained that separation of powers did not intend
that the branches of government:
'ought to have no partial agency in, or no control over, the acts
of each other,' but rather that
where the whole power of one department is exercised by the
same hands which possess the whole power of another department, the fundamental principles of a free constitution
are subverted.
The evil is '[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few or
many.' Such an accumulation, said Madison, 'may justly be
pronounced the very definition of tyranny.'6
Or, as Lord Acton so aptly stated: "Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely." 7
Thus, the separation-of-powers doctrine evolved in this country
not as an end in itself, but as a general principle to maintain the
4 Mulhearn v. Federal Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co., 2 N.J. 356, 363, 66 A.2d

726, 729-30 (1949) (citing Sir William Searle Holdsworth, 10

HISTORY OF ENGLISH

LAW 713-24).
5

Id.

Arthur Bestor, Separationof Powers in the Domain of Foreign Affairs: The Intent of the
Constitution Historically Examined, 5 SETON HALL L. REV. 527, 536-37 (1974) (emphasis in original) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 308 (James Madison) (H. Lodge
ed., 1888); THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 301-02 (James Madison) (H. Lodge ed.,
1888)).
7 First Baron John Emerich Acton, Letter to Bishop Mandell Creighton April 5,
1887, reprinted in Lord Acton, ESSAYS ON FREEDOM AND POWER 364 (1949).
6

1992]

THE NE WJERSE Y EXPERIENCE

balance between the three branches of government, to preserve
their respective independence and integrity, and to prevent the concentration of unchecked power in the hands of any one branch.
While the system has developed in many ways that Madison could
not have foreseen, it has continued to function as he envisioned it
would: as a network of checks and counter-checks within a representative government.
Interestingly, the Constitution of the United States does not explicitly provide for a separation of powers. Instead, by setting forth
the establishment of the three branches of government and delegating to them their respective powers, it implies the doctrine. Unlike
the federal Constitution, however, the New Jersey Constitution specifically provides for the separation of powers among the branches
of government.'
The separation-of-powers article first appeared in substantially
its present form in the New Jersey Constitution of 1844. Under the
prior constitution of 1776, the doctrine of separation of powers was
completely ignored. The Governor served as President of the
Council, the upper house of the legislature, and as Chancellor and
Ordinary, or Surrogate General. The Governor and the Council
constituted the Court of Appeals of Last Resort, and the legislature
elected the Governor annually, as well as the justices of the supreme
court and the judges of the Court of Common Pleas.9 Historians
claim that the 1844 constitution was drafted "to remedy the fundamental defects of the constitution of 1776, which was hastily framed
and adopted within nine days under revolutionary pressure."'
Despite the explicit constitutional language concerning the separation of powers in our state, we have always recognized that the
doctrine does not require an absolute division of powers, but a cooperative accommodation among the three branches of government. The doctrine's aim is not to prevent such cooperative action,
but to guarantee a system in which one branch cannot accumulate
undue authority. The separation-of-powers doctrine under the
1947 New Jersey Constitution was first addressed by Chief Justice
8 Article III, paragraph 1 of the New Jersey Constitution reads:
The powers of the government shall be divided among three distinct
branches, the legislative, executive, and judicial. No person or persons belonging to or constituting one branch shall exercise any of the
powers properly belonging to either of the others, except as expressly
provided in this Constitution.
9 Mulhearn, 2 N.J. at 362-63, 66 A.2d at 729.
10 See id. at 362, 66 A.2d at 729.
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Vanderbilt in three cases: Massett Building Company v. Bennett,"
Mulhearn v. FederalShipbuildingand Dry Dock Company,' 2 and,
the most
3
famous of the three, the landmark Winbery v. Salisbury.'
ChiefJustice Vanderbilt recognized early that a rigid and inflexible classification of the branches of government into mutually-exclusive, water-tight compartments would, and I quote from his
opinion in Massett, "render government unworkable."' 4 In that
case, ChiefJustice Vanderbilt, writing for the court, held that a statute relating to judicial investigations of county and municipal affairs
did not violate the separation-of-powers provision of the New Jersey
Constitution. 5
In Mulhearn, the issue was whether the adjudicatory functions of
the Division of Workmen's Compensation in the executive branch
were the work of an "inferior court" under the constitution, giving
the state supreme court power to review its judgments directly by
certification. 6 The Vanderbilt court held that the Division of Workmen's Compensation was not a court but an administrative tribunal
within a department that was a component part of the executive
branch.' 7 Accordingly, the court was without jurisdiction to grant
certification. As expressed by Chief Justice Vanderbilt:
[The defendant's] failure to comprehend that administrative
adjudication is not judicial springs from the erroneous notion
that all adjudication is judicial. That is not so and never has
been so .... Once the obvious right of the Governor and the
Legislature, each to adjudicate within his or its own proper
sphere, is recognized and it is conceded that the courts are not
the exclusive instrumentalities for adjudication, the true nature of the administrative adjudications, commonly termed
'quasi-judicial,' becomes apparent. This term serves to characterize not the quality of the adjudication but its origin outside
the judicial branch of government.'"
I'

4 N.J. 53, 71 A.2d 327 (1950).

12
13

2 N.J. 356, 66 A.2d 726 (1949).
5 N.J. 240, 74 A.2d 406, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 877 (1950).

14

Massett, 4 N.J. at 57, 71 A.2d at 329.

15

The court in Massett examined N.J.

STAT. ANN.

§ 40:6-1, which related to in-

vestigations of municipal and county expenditures. Id. at 56, 71 A.2d at 329. That
statute has since been repealed by the legislature.
16 Article VI, section V, paragraph 1 of the New Jersey Constitution reads:
Appeals may be taken to the Supreme Court:
(d) On certification by the Supreme Court to the Superior Court and,
where provided by rules of the Supreme Court, to the County
Courts and the inferior courts....
17 Mulhearn, 2 N.J. at 365, 66 A.2d at 731.
18

Id. at 364, 365, 66 A.2d at 730.
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The most important decision for the judiciary, and I would
hasten to add for attorneys, was Chief Justice Vanderbilt's opinion
in Winbeny. Although the controversy in Winberry was limited to defining the scope of the New Jersey Supreme Court's rule-making
power, the opinion laid the groundwork on which the court,
through subsequent decisions, delineated its position with respect
to the two other branches of government.
In Winberry, the court addressed a conflict between a court rule
and a statute dealing with the time to appeal, a subject clearly involving the practice and procedure in all state courts.' 9 To resolve
the issue, the court had to interpret the nature and extent of the
judicial power under article VI, section 2, paragraph 3 of the constitution. Although the 1844 constitution contained a separation-ofpowers clause, it was not until the 1947 constitution that article VI,
section 2, paragraph 3 gave the supreme court the authority to make
rules governing the administration of the judicial system.
Article VI, section 2, paragraph 3 provides:
The Supreme Court shall make rules governing the administration of all courts in the State and subject to law, the practice
and procedure in all such courts. The Supreme Court shall
have jurisdiction over the admission to the practice of law and
the discipline of persons admitted.
Specifically, in Winberry, the issue was whether "subject to law" allowed the legislature to override all the rules of the court, even
those dealing with the court's own rules and procedures. Chief Justice Vanderbilt held that complete power and responsibility in the
judiciary are concepts inconsistent with the notions of overriding
legislation. He realized that if the legislature could overrule the
courts in some of their essential operations, the judiciary "instead of
being one of the three coordinate branches of the State Government, would have been rendered subservient to the legislature in a
20
fashion never contemplated by any."

So the Vanderbilt court interpreted the phrase "subject to law"
to refer to laws "substantive in content" that define our rights and
duties, but not to refer to the court's exclusive powers of rule-making with respect to practice and procedure, the administration of the
courts and the professional conduct of members of the bench and
bar. 2 '
Justice Handler, in his 1981 opinion in Knight v. City of Mar19 Winberry, 5 N.J. at 243, 74 A.2d at 408.
20

Id. at 247, 74 A.2d at 410.

21

Id. at 247-48, 74 A.2d at 410.
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gate, 22 sets forth the court's current view on accommodating separation between the legislative and judicial branches. Indeed, Knight is
a good illustration of how far the supreme court will go to accommodate the legislature when it is dealing with matters directly concerning that branch's legitimate governmental interest and that do
not unduly intrude on the judiciary's authority.
Knight evaluated the constitutionality of the legislature's 1980
amendment to the New Jersey Conflicts of Interest Law,23 which
prohibited certain public officials, including members of the judiciary, from dealings or relationships with casinos.2 4
The statute was challenged on the grounds that the New Jersey
Constitution precluded the legislature from enacting any laws purporting to govern the ethical conduct of members of the judiciary or
persons admitted to the practice of law. 25
Justice Handler, writing for the majority, immediately affirmed
the supreme court's extensive constitutional powers. Relying on
Winberry, the Justice noted that: "The Court's authority with respect
to the administration of the courts is far-reaching; it encompasses
the entire judicial structure and necessarily covers all aspects and
incidents related to the justice system."'2 6 The same holds true of
the court's power over the conduct of the members of the bar and
bench.
Thus, the question squarely presented was whether such legislative actions could be accommodated with the state supreme
court's preeminent, exclusive and extensive constitutional powers.
We held that it could be so accommodated.
The court reiterated its belief that "[t]he constitutional doctrine
of the separation of powers denotes not only independence but also
interdependence among the branches of government. '2 7 Separa86 N.J. 374, 431 A.2d 833 (1981).
The New Jersey Conflicts of Interest Law, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:13D-12 (West
1986), was made applicable to the New Jersey Casino Control Commission, the
Division of Gaming Enforcement and all employees of both agencies by the legislature through enactment of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-59 (West 1988).
The legislature, through enactment of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-59(b) (West
1988), also required the Casino Control Commission to adopt a code of ethics
modeled on the judicial code of ethics of the New Jersey Supreme Court.
As a result, dealings between those employees and casino operators were
strictly limited.
24 In 1980, the Legislature amended the Conflicts of Interest Law to include all
members of the judiciary in its limitation on dealings with casino operators.
25 Knight, 86 N.J. at 386, 431 A.2d at 839.
26 Id. at 387, 431 A.2d at 839-40 (citing Winberry v. Salisbury, 5 N.J. 240, cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 877 (1950)).
27 Id. at 388, 431 A.2d at 840.
22
23
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tion of powers contemplates that the several branches will cooperate
so that government will succeed in its mission. Indeed, as Justice
Handler so elegantly phrased it, "[ilnevitably some osmosis occurs
when the branches of government touch one another; the powers of
one branch sometimes take on the hue and characteristics of the
powers of the others." 28
The constitutional validity of a coordinate branch's action turns
on the legitimacy of the action's underlying purpose and the nature
and extent of its encroachment on judicial prerogatives and interests. In assessing whether the legislature's actions pose an unbridgeable conflict, the question is considered not with "a jealous or
begrudging evaluation by the Court of comparative judicial and legislative interests, but a realistic and fraternal appreciation of the
profound concern of the legislature, an equal branch of government ....-"2' Finding that the goals and prohibitions of the conflict
of interest law were substantially similar to the goals and spirit of
the court's ethical rules, the Knight court held that the legislature
had not interfered with the supreme court's administration or regulation of the judiciary or the legal profession.
The widely-repeated term "separation of powers" is misleading. The system is more accurately described as one of "separated
institutions sharing powers." At times, the result is a seemingly
confused, rather than a neat, political system. All the branches of
government in New Jersey realize, however, that an absolute division of powers would not serve the public well.
Initially in New Jersey separation-of-power questions concerning the relationship between the legislative and judicial branches
arose in two kinds of cases: those that focused on the power of the
legislature to make laws that interfered with judicial authority, Winberry and Knight being the two best examples, and those where, as
Justice Handler stated in Knight, the nature of the governmental
power in question "defies exact placement or neat categorization
[and where] it may not always be possible to identify a subject as
belonging exclusively to a particular branch." 0 In State v. Leonardis
131 and State v. Leonardis 11,32 the issue was whether the pretrial intervention program3 3 created by court rules belonged in the judicial
Id.
Id. at 392, 431 A.2d at 842.
Id. at 389, 431 A.2d at 840.
71 NJ. 85, 363 A.2d 321 (1976).
73 NJ. 360, 375 A.2d 607 (1977).
33 The pretrial intervention (PTI) program was created by court rules as a procedural alternative to the traditional system of prosecuting and incarcerating crimi28
29
30
31
32
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or legislative branch. In In re: Salariesfor Probation Officers of Bergen
County 4 and Passaic County Probation Officers' Ass'n v. County of Passaic,3 5 the issue was whether the legislature, the judiciary, or both
branches had authority over public employees, such as probation
officers, whose duties are an integral part of the judicial system.
More recently, however, the focus of the separation-of-powers
debate has shifted from such turf battles and concerns about the
legislature trespassing on the judiciary's prerogatives to questions
of whether the judicial branch is trespassing on the legislature's authority. Instead of whether the court has the power to intervene to
invalidate governmental action, the issue has become whether the
court can compel the other branches of government to act, and if
they fail to do so, whether the court may act on its own accord.
Concern about the dangers of "judicial activism" or "judicial
legislation," however, are not new. Indeed, there probably never
has been a period in American history when judicial decisions were
not challenged as exceeding legal authority and intruding on the
power of the legislature.
It is important to recognize that within this governmental check and
balance system there is also the public's capacity to trigger checks and
balances. We all know that individuals and groups, aggrieved by
one branch's interpretation of the Constitution or a law, may mobilize and use their access to another branch to frustrate or reverse
policies they do not like or to reinforce those that they do. A clear
example in NewJersey is seen in the area of charitable immunity. In
1958, after a trilogy of decisions abrogating common law charitable
nal suspects. Leonardis I, 71 N.J. at 92, 363 A.2d at 324-25. The program avoids
trial of criminal defendants where full-scale "prosecution would be counterproductive, ineffective or unwarranted." Id. at 89, 363 A.2d 323. Instead, defendants
enter a rehabilitative program, and on successful completion, the government
abandons prosecution of the underlying charges. Admission into the programs is
conditioned on approval of the prosecutor. Id. at 113, 363 A.2d at 336.
In Leonardis I, the court held that the judicial power to create such a program
through rulemaking was accompanied by an implied power to review the operation
and procedures of the program as well as any legal determinations it produces. Id.
at 109, 363 A.2d at 333-34.
In Leonardis H, the court held that the administration of PTI programs was not
a judicial encroachment on the legislative power to fix punishment for criminal activity. Leonardis II, 73 N.J. at 372, 375 A.2d at 613.
34 58 N.J. 422, 278 A.2d 417 (1971) (holding that statute permitting judges to
appoint probation officers and to fix their salaries does not violate separation-ofpowers doctrine).
35 73 N.J. 247, 374 A.2d 449 (1977) (holding that probation officers serve as an
integral part of the court system and necessarily come within the supervision and
regulation of the judicial branch).
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immunity, 6 the charities prevailed on the legislature to pass a statute reinstating such immunity within three months of the court's
decisions.3 7
Groups not only seek access to the legislature, however, to redress their grievances against the court; they also seek access to the
courts to address their grievances against the legislature. Indeed,
recourse to the courts may be the most practical avenue open to a
group lacking numbers, prestige or money, or to similarly-situated
individuals who seek either to challenge legislative or executive action or to establish new constitutional rights."8
There is little doubt that over the past twenty years people have
increasingly turned to the courts for individual and social justice.
Laws creating new causes of action in the environmental field, in the
areas of civil rights and consumer rights, to name a few, have increased at a geometric rate and permeate all aspects of society. All
these developments impact on the justice system, the public and the
media's perception of the judiciary, and raise the fear of judicial
activism.
A realistic appraisal of the judiciary's authority, however, discloses several significant limitations on its alleged ability to legislate.
First and foremost, judges are not self-starters. We do not initiate
action. We must wait for an actual dispute between genuinely-adverse parties who have standing to bring an issue before a court.
Moreover, once a dispute is brought before a court, the court may
only address the issues as presented in that case. Unlike the legislature, we are constricted in our fact-finding to the evidence provided
by the parties in the case before us. Moreover, we have little control
over our agenda. Courts simply cannot decline to hear cases properly brought before them. Even at the appellate level, many courts
may exercise little influence over what subject matters reach their
docket.3 9
Second, although our opinions may carry influence as precedent, their immediate reach is circumscribed. Unlike a statute, our
36 See Dalton v. St. Luke's Catholic Church, 27 N.J. 22, 141 A.2d 273 (1958);
Collopy v. Newark Eye and Ear Infirmary, 27 N.J. 29, 141 A.2d 276 (1958); Benton
v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n of Westfield, 27 N.J. 67, 141 A.2d 298 (1958).
37 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-7 (West 1987).
38 For a thorough discussion of the ability of interest groups to trigger action
within a governmental system based on the separation of powers, see WALTER F.
MURPHY, JAMES E. FLEMING AND WILLIAM F. HARRIS, II, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION 52-54 (1986).
S9 See generally G. Alan Tarr and Russell S. Harrison, Legitimacy and Capacity in
State Supreme Court Policymaking: The New Jersey Court and Exclusionary Zoning, 15
RUTGERS L.J. 513, 543 (1984).
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decision only binds the parties before the court. For instance, even
the landmark decision of Brown v. Board of Education4' held only that
school segregation in Topeka, Kansas was unconstitutional. It did
not require the officials of other boards of education to desegregate
their schools.
Third, courts are limited in the number and kinds of remedies
they may fashion. Although we can declare a statute unconstitutional, we cannot compel the legislature to enact a new law or compel the Executive to prosecute those who violate a law. Although we
may invalidate a statute for failure to protect the rights of minorities, we cannot directly compel the other branches to enact a law
that protects a particular class of citizens. Additionally, we must rely
on the executive to enforce our judgments. 4 '
Without the power of the purse or the ability to appeal directly
to the people (as the other branches can), the real effect of our decisions on the populace is narrow. Thus, the contours of judicial
practice are designed to create a formidable barrier against the judicial branch trespassing on the legislature's power.
As Chief Justice Weintraub accurately recognized, however,
courts make decisional law every time they adjudicate a case. They
may fill gaps in existing statutes and previous decisions. Many of
the cases concern the interpretation of new statutes or create new
statutory cause of actions, thus permitting the judiciary to craft the
foundation for an entire area of law. In such situations, it is a court
that may issue the first public pronouncement of how a person's
rights are affected by a new law. It is, however, the legislature's intent that is being interpreted, not that of the courts - a point often
missed by those who rally against judicial activism.
What is not so readily understood is that the legislature and the
judiciary together make law and the legislature often relies on
courts to amplify, elaborate upon and, indeed, at times to create the
law.
Lawmaking is, to an extent, a continuum. Regardless of
whether the judicial or legislative branch undertakes the task, there
is a functional bridge between the legislative enactment and the judicial interpretation and application of statutes. In making law, the
legislature is guided by the precedent of the decisional law, as well
as by political concerns. Indeed, in adopting the Uniform Commercial Code or the model penal statute, the legislature looked to the
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
For a discussion of the limits on judicial lawmaking power, see Charles D.
Breitel, Lawmakers, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 749 (1965).
40

41
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decisional and statutory laws for precedent, consistency, the effect
on policy factors and, of course, the reasonable expectations of the
42
community.
It is also clear that the legislature, bolstered by the common law
tradition of the evolution of the law by the courts, often drafts statutes in broad terms, intentionally leaving to the courts, and increasingly to the executive branch, the obligation to fill in statutory
43
gaps.
In New Jersey, however, the most significant method for passing lawmaking responsibilities on to the courts has been the legislature's simple failure to act. 44 The stalemate sometimes results from
deadlock, the inability to reach a consensus on the issue, the fear of
political repercussions or simply the inability to resolve an extraordinarily difficult issue facing society.
In 1985, in his address to this august body, Justice Handler defined a hard case as one in which existing law is inadequate and that
requires creative and novel reasoning, albeit grounded on sound
legal principles, to reach a sound disposition.4 5 Cases without precedent propel the law toward new horizons. These cases invariably
involve issues of social policy or public morality. Understandably, in
these areas the legislature may find it difficult to act. It is, therefore,
not surprising that in deciding these hard cases, the courts are perceived to have ventured beyond their appropriate jurisdictional role
and to have engaged in legislating. Those who think so, however,
do not recognize that the legislature has failed to act and that the
court has been presented with a case that it is constitutionally obligated to resolve.
The right-to-die cases demonstrate such an area of law. In each
of the right-to-die opinions, Quinlan,46 Conroy,4 7 jobes,48 Farrell,4 9 and
42 Id.

at 760.

43 Id. at 761.
44 See id. at 762.
45 The contents ofJustice Handler's address to the Harvard Law School Association of NewJersey on November 21, 1985 were adapted into an article,Jurisprudence
and PrudentialJustice, which appears at 16 SETON HALL L. REV. 571 (1986).
46 In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied sub nom, Garger v. New

Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976) (holding that individuals in persistent, vegetative or
comatose state with no reasonable prospect of recovery have right to terminate
extraordinary, life-saving measures administered to them).
47 In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985) (holding that elderly, institu-

tionalized patients with serious and permanent mental and physical impairments
who are expected to live less than one year even with treatment have right to terminate non-extraordinary, life-sustaining treatment administered to them).
48 In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987) (holding that non-elderly,
institutionalized patients in a persistent vegetative state who have not previously
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Peter,50 the court repeatedly called on the other branches of government to resolve issues raising profound moral, social, religious,
technological, philosophical and legal questions that presented
themselves with increasing frequency. We stated time and again
that the legislature was the proper branch of government to set
guidelines in that area. But patients, their families and physicians,
faced with these difficult and complex decisions and operating
under threat of civil or criminal liability, had no legislative guidelines. Understandably, they turned to the courts for relief.
In response to the concerns expressed in our opinions, the legislature, in 1985, created the NewJersey Bioethics Commission. After numerous hearings ranging over a six-year period, the
legislature passed the New Jersey Advance Directives for Health
Care Act 5 ' in November, 1991. The legislation largely implemented
the Commission's recommendations, which, in turn, had relied
heavily on the court's right-to-die decisions.
Clearly, our prior decisions raised both the visibility of the issues involved and the public's consciousness of the novel problem.
Without the court's prodding, resolution of the questions raised
may never have been realized.
Other areas particularly fraught with danger for a legislator involve new constitutional rights, particularly rights not universally
embraced by the public. A good example of such a situation, perhaps the best, is that presented by the questions addressed in the
Mount Laurel trilogy.
The three Mount Laurel cases demonstrate the separateness, as
well as the interdependence, of the governmental powers. In 1975,
in Mount Laurel J,52 the supreme court, aware of the legislative charexpressed an opinion regarding attitude towards treatment have right to terminate
non-extraordinary, life-sustaining treatments administered to them).
49 In re Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 529 A.2d 404 (1987) (holding that non-institutionalized, competent patients who are terminally ill and can express their wishes
have right to terminate non-extraordinary, life-sustaining treatment administered
to them).
50 In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 419 (1987) (holding that institutionalized
patients in persistent, vegetative state but who are not expected to die in the near
future and who have expressed attitudes about treatment before incompetency
have right to terminate non-extraordinary, life-sustaining treatments administered
to them).
51 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-53 (West 1987).
52 Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J.
151, 336 A.2d 713, appealdismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975) (holding that
state constitution forbids developing municipalities from foreclosing through zoning regulation the realistic opportunity to construct low-income and moderate-income housing units).
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acter of the issues to be resolved, explicitly afforded the coordinating branches the opportunity to address the problem. No action
was taken, compelling the court eight years later in Mount Laurel I 53
to fashion a remedial program to effectuate the constitutional obligation to provide the opportunity to build affordable housing.
From the outset, Chief Justice Wilentz, writing for the court, recognized that the issues being addressed were far more amenable to
legislative and executive attention than to judicial action. As Chief
Justice Wilentz wrote:
[A] brief reminder of the judicial role in this sensitive area is
appropriate, since powerful reasons suggest, and we agree,
that the matter is better left to the Legislature ....

[But] while

we always have preferred legislative to judicial action in this
field, we shall continue -

until the Legislature acts -

to do

our best to uphold the constitutional obligation that underlies
the Mount Laurel doctrine. That is our duty. We may not build
houses, but we do enforce the Constitution.5 4
Importantly, we signalled our clear intention to abate our role
in the area if the other branches of government took sufficient steps
toward fulfilling the constitutional mandate articulated in Mount
Laurel L

Mount Laurel II demonstrates both the effective role the court
can play and its limitations. As the Chief Justice stated with respect
to our limitations, we cannot build houses. Without people pushing
the other branches to act, the effectiveness of our remedies remains
questionable. We can, however, place an issue at the front of the
state's political agenda. No one doubts that, but for the Mount Laurel I1 decision, the New Jersey Fair Housing Act 55 would not have
been enacted. The court was the legislature's catalyst.
The court gave the other branches not only an incentive to act
the desire to remove the judiciary from the field of affordable
housing - but also gave the legislature cover to help it avoid political flack: "I don't want to do this, but the court made me."
In Mount Laurel II,56 we kept the promise articulated in Mount
Laurel II and momentarily withdrew from the field when the legislature acted. As the Chief Justice so eloquently stated:
53 Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 92 N.J.
158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983) (reaffirming the holding of Mount Laurel I and establish-

ing judicially-imposed remedies to carry out its mandate).
54 Id. at 212-13, 456 A.2d at 417.
55 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-301 to -309 (West 1986).
56 The Hills Development Co. v. Township of Bernards, 103 N.J. 1, 510 A.2d
621 (1986).
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By virtue of the [New Jersey Fair Housing] Act, the three
branches of government in NewJersey are now committed to a
common goal ....
This kind of response, one that would permit us to withdraw from this field, is what this Court has always
wanted and sought. It is potentially far better for the State
57
and for its lower income citizens.
As one commentator has noted:
If it was not clear before, Mount Laurel III leaves no doubt that
the court's attempt in Mount Laurel H to implement the constitutional obligation never was intended to usurp the responsibilities of the political branches. Indeed, the preferability of
the legislative and executive solution is reiterated no fewer
than ten times throughout Mount Laurel II.58
The Mount Laurel trilogy and the right-to-die cases involve a mix
of individual and societal rights. They address not only the particular parties to the action but community and societal interests as well.
Ultimately, they can only be resolved by intergovernmental responsibility, initiative and cooperation. The cases show, however, how
the judiciary can serve as a spark for both legal and social change.
In contemporary jurisprudence, it is impossible to catalogue all
the ways the judicial branch and the legislative branch accommodate
each other. We know, however, that such accommodation takes
place in many instances.
The enactment of the 1960 Evidence Act 5 9 and the court's interpretation of the statute to date is a good example of the continuous accommodation between the judicial and legislative branches.
The Act's historical background is set forth in State v. D.R. 60 a 1988
opinion. Briefly, as previously discussed, the 1947 constitution gave
the judiciary rule-making power over "practice and procedure" in
the courts but was otherwise silent on the power to adopt rules of
evidence.
In Busik v. Levine, 6 ' Chief Justice Weintraub acknowledged the
difficulty of classifying evidence as either "substance" or "procedure," conceding that both classifications are descriptive of different
applications of the rules of evidence. That same conceptual difficulty in determining whether evidence was or was not within the
judiciary's exclusive power to adopt rules of "procedure" led to an
57 Id. at 63, 65, 510 A.2d at 654, 655.
58 Paula A. Franzese, Mount Laurel III: The New Jersey Supreme Court'sJudicious Retreat, 18 SETON HALL L. REV. 30, 50 (1988).
59 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-33 to 2A:84A-49 (West 1976).
60

109 NJ. 348, 374-75, 537 A.2d 667, 680-81 (1988).

61

63 N.J. 351, 307 A.2d 571, appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 1106 (1973).
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impasse between the branches of government in the late 1950s.
During that period separate committees designated by the judiciary
and the legislature studied proposed rules of evidence for New
Jersey, but stalemated over which body had the power to adopt the
rules .62

The deadlock was broken by the passage of the Evidence Act,
which provided the mechanism for the adoption of additional rules.
The rationale for the pragmatic compromise crafted by the Act was
explained by Chief Justice Weintraub in Busik:
The rules of evidence were adopted cooperatively by the three
branches of government under the Evidence Act, 1960.

.

. af-

ter the Supreme Court and the Legislature conducted their
separate studies.... Thus we did not pursue to a deadlock the
question whether "evidence" was "procedural" and therefore... the sole province of the Supreme Court. Nor were we

deterred by the specter of the criticism that, if "evidence" is
"substantive," it was unseemly or worse for the Court to participate in the "wholesale" promulgation of substantive law.
The single question was whether it made sense thus to provide
for the administration of justice, and the answer being clear,
we went ahead.63
The Evidence Act provided for the current statutory procedure
for adopting new or revised evidence rules.6 4
The court, however, is not statutorily precluded from effecting
change in the rules governing the admission of evidence. Rule 5 of
the New Jersey Rules of Evidence provides that "[t]he adoption of
these rules shall not bar the growth and development of the law of
evidence in accordance with fundamental principles to the end that
the truth may be fairly ascertained."
62

Alexander D. Brooks, Evidence, 14

63
64

Busik, 63 N.J. at 367-68, 307 A.2d at 580 (footnote omitted).
As explained in State v. D.R. :
Pursuant to the Evidence Act, 1960, the procedure for adopting new
or revised rules requires that a draft of the proposed rule be entered
on the agenda and discussed at a Judicial Conference . . . publicly

RUTGERS

L.

REV.

390, 391-92 (1960).

announced by th[e] Court on "September 15 next" following theJu-

dicial Conference and concurrently delivered to the President of the
Senate, Speaker of the General Assembly, and the Governor.... Unless canceled by a joint resolution of the Senate and Assembly signed
by the Governor, the proposed rule becomes effective on July 1 next
following the rule's announcement by the Court.... In addition, th[e]

Court may adopt or revise rules of evidence at any time, without presentation at a Judicial Conference, with the concurrence of the Senate
and General Assembly reflected by a joint resolution adopted by
those bodies and signed by the Governor.
State v. D.R., 109 N.J. at 375, 533 A.2d at 681.
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Former Federal Judge Vincent P. Biunno, who was involved in
the efforts that led to the Evidence Act, commented on the intended
scope of Rule 5:
This is not a rule of relaxation, and neither trial judges nor
appellate courts are to so consider it.... There will be areas in

which evidence law will continue to develop on a case-by-case
decisional basis ....

At the same time, it is not to be expected

that the appellate courts will employ the decisional process on
a case-by-case basis to modify the formal rules in the event it
should seem that the applicable rules, as adopted, ought to be
modified on the basis of experience or theory.6 5
In State v. D.R., the court examined whether new rules concerning the admission of an out-of-court statement by the child victim of
sexual abuse constituted a change that "ought to be modified on the
basis of experience or theory" and hence modified pursuant to the
statutory procedures set forth in the Evidence Act, 1960. We held
that it was such a rule and it would be inappropriate for a fundamental change of that magnitude to be adopted solely by judicial decision. However, as Justice Stein, writing for the court, explained:
We come to that conclusion not on the basis of constitutional
power, but as a matter of comity, with due regard both to the
complexity of the subject matter and for the cooperative
mechanism that has been relied on in the past to promulgate
New Jersey's Rules of Evidence.6 6
Examples of the interplay and accommodation between the legislative and judicial branch abound. Of course, sentencing authority
has long been shared among all three branches of government. In
State v. Des Marets,67 we recognized that the mandatory-sentencing
scheme established by the Graves Act 6" intruded on the judicial prerogative to suspend sentences in criminal actions, a power courts in
New Jersey have exercised since 1846. Reasoning that mandatory
sentences would be meaningless if a judge could suspend them,
however, the court recognized the substantial public interest and
clear legitimacy of the legislative power in this area and held its exercise of power constitutionally permissive in that instance.6 9
The court is most active when the legislature has not spoken,
when in a sense we are the last resource available to aggrieved indi65 Id. at 372-73, 537 A.2d at 679-80 (quoting N.J. R.
ments at xvii-xviii (1987)).
66

67
68
69

Id. at 376, 537 A.2d at 681.
92 N.J. 62, 455 A.2d 1074 (1983).
N.J. STAT. ANN. 2C:43-6(c) (West 1982).
Des Marets, 92 N.J. at 80, 455 A.2d at 1083.

EvID.,

Preliminary Com-
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viduals. For example, in Comite Organizadorde TrabajadoresAgricolas v.
Molinelli,7" we had to define the rights and remedies available to migrant and seasonal Puerto Rican farm workers. There were no state
or federal labor relations statutes governing such workers. Article I,
paragraph 19 of the New Jersey Constitution 7 ' was the only source
of protection they had. We used the state constitution to apply specific statutory protections not yet adopted by the federal or state
legislatures. 72
In contrast, when the legislature has spoken, particularly where
the allocation of government money is the core of the dispute, the
court gives great deference to it. The court is rightly hesitant to
invalidate a legislative program before that program has had a
chance to be tested. In Barone v. Department of Human Services,73 the
court upheld the eligibility provisions of the Pharmaceutical Assistance to the Aged and Disabled Act, 74 reaffirming the legislature's
power to allocate the resources of the State. So long as the classifications chosen by the legislature rationally advance a legitimate governmental objective, the method need not be the fairest available
nor the statutory scheme we would have selected. It is simply not
for the courts to determine the best method of allocating State
resources.
All of these cases demonstrate that the New Jersey experience
remains one of continuous and fluid dialogue among all the
branches of government in seeking an accommodation of their respective powers. History teaches us that democracy does not survive unless power is divided. This lesson was learned by the
founding fathers of our nation and it has been followed in New
Jersey by all three branches of government.
The New Jersey experience demonstrates that we have learned
to accommodate the separation between the legislature and the judiciary and that both branches have worked together through the
70 114 N.J. 87, 552 A.2d 1003 (1989).
71 Article I, paragraph 19 of the New Jersey Constitution reads:

Persons in private employment shall have the right to organize and
bargain collectively. Persons in public employment shall have the
right to organize, present to and make known to the State, or any of
its political subdivisions or agencies, their grievances and proposals
72

through representatives of their own choosing.
Comite Organizador,114 N.J. at 96, 552 A.2d at 1007-08 ("In the absence of...

implementing legislation, we have held that [Article I, paragraph 19] is self-executing and that the courts have both the power and obligation to enforce rights and
remedies under this constitutional provision.").
73 107 N.J. 355, 526 A.2d 1055 (1987).
74 See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4D-20 to -35 (West 1981).
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years to provide one of the best legal systems in the nation for the
people of New Jersey - a legacy of which Arthur T. Vanderbilt
justly can be proud.

